Y Pwyllgor Deddfwriaeth, Cyfiawnder a’r Cyfansoddiad - Y Bumed Senedd

Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee - Fifth Senedd

15/06/2020

Aelodau'r Pwyllgor a oedd yn bresennol

Committee Members in Attendance

Carwyn Jones
Dai Lloyd
David Melding Yn dirprwyo ar ran Suzy Davies
Substitute for Suzy Davies
Mick Antoniw Cadeirydd y Pwyllgor
Committee Chair

Y rhai eraill a oedd yn bresennol

Others in Attendance

Chris Warner Dirprwy Gyfarwyddwr, Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Chysylltiadau Rhynglywodraethol, Llywodraeth Cymru
Deputy Director, Constitutional Affairs and Inter-governmental Relations, Welsh Government
Des Clifford Cyfarwyddwr Cyffredinol, Swyddfa’r Prif Weinidog, Llywodraeth Cymru
Director General, Office of the First Minister, Welsh Government
Jeremy Miles Y Cwnsler Cyffredinol a'r Gweinidog Pontio Ewropeaidd
Counsel General and Minister for European Transition

Swyddogion y Senedd a oedd yn bresennol

Senedd Officials in Attendance

Gareth Howells Cynghorydd Cyfreithiol
Legal Adviser
P Gareth Williams Clerc
Clerk
Rachael Davies Dirprwy Glerc
Deputy Clerk
Sarah Sargent Ail Glerc
Second Clerk

Cofnodir y trafodion yn yr iaith y llefarwyd hwy ynddi yn y pwyllgor. Yn ogystal, cynhwysir trawsgrifiad o’r cyfieithu ar y pryd. Lle mae cyfranwyr wedi darparu cywiriadau i’w tystiolaeth, nodir y rheini yn y trawsgrifiad.

The proceedings are reported in the language in which they were spoken in the committee. In addition, a transcription of the simultaneous interpretation is included. Where contributors have supplied corrections to their evidence, these are noted in the transcript.

Cyfarfu'r pwyllgor drwy gynhadledd fideo.

Dechreuodd y cyfarfod am 10:00.

The committee met by video-conference.

The meeting began at 10:00. 

1. Cyflwyniad, ymddiheuriadau, dirprwyon a datgan buddiannau
1. Introduction, apologies, substitutions and declarations of interest

I welcome Members to this virtual meeting of the Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee. In accordance with Standing Order 34.19, I've determined that the public are excluded from the committee's meeting in order to protect public health. In accordance with Standing Order 34.21, notice of this decision was included in the agenda for this meeting published last Thursday. This meeting is, however, being broadcast live on Senedd.tv, and a Record of Proceedings will be published as usual. Aside from the procedural adaptation relating to conducting proceedings remotely, all other Standing Order requirements for committees remain in place. Suzy Davies has submitted apologies. David Melding is substituting for items 11 to 13, which will begin with the evidence session with the Counsel General. 

Just in terms of a few housekeeping arrangements: ensuring mobile devices are switched to silent; Senedd Cymru operates through the medium of Welsh and English languages; interpretation is available during the meeting; and Members are reminded that the sound operator is controlling the microphones and as such there's no need to mute and unmute during the course of the meeting. Are there any declarations of interest? If there aren't any, then we'll move straight on to item 2 on the agenda. 

2. Offerynnau sy'n codi materion i gyflwyno adroddiad arnynt i'r Senedd o dan Reol Sefydlog 21.2 neu 21.3
2. Instruments that raise issues to be reported to the Senedd under Standing Order 21.2 or 21.3

We're on to the Census (Wales) Regulations 2020. You'll see there a considerable amount of documentation and a draft of the report, the regulations and the explanatory memorandum. These regulations make provision for the operational arrangements and procedures necessary for the conduct of the 2021 census, and they prescribe the questionnaires that will be used. Now, Senedd lawyers have identified technical and merits points for reporting, and a Government response has not yet been received to those. If I can go over to Gareth for the merits points and technical points. 

Diolch. Yes, there is one technical point and five merits points, starting on pack-page 1. The technical point notes that the regulations do not always use gender-neutral language. For example, the regulations refer to gender-specific 'son' and 'daughter', but they also use the gender neutral 'grandchild'. So, the Welsh Government is asked to explain its approach to gender-neutral drafting.

The first merits point notes that imposing a legal duty to provide census information engages article 8 of the European convention on human rights, and the right to a private life. There's no suggestion that there is any breach of article 8 because there appears to be clear justification for requesting census information, but the merits point notes that all of this is in the sphere of private life and so article 8 of the convention is engaged.

The second merits point relates to the use of the word 'household' and the Welsh translation. The English word 'household' is used both in the main body of the regulations and in the census questionnaires themselves. In the Welsh text, 'household' is translated as 'aelwyd' in the main body of the regulations, but in the census questionnaires 'household' is translated as 'cartref'. So, in the English you have 'household' and 'households', and in the Welsh you have 'aelwyd' and 'cartref', and the merits point asks why this approach was taken as it seems to add an added layer of complication to interpretation. 

Okay, thank you for that. [Interruption.] I beg your pardon; there's a further point, isn't there? 

Yes. The third merits point notes a difference of approach between the English text and the Welsh text for the census questionnaires. For example, in the English text there is reference to 'any qualifications you have ever achieved in Wales, England or worldwide' but the Welsh refers to qualifications received in Wales or worldwide. Now, the answer you will give will be the same no matter which language you use, but the merits point asks the Welsh Government to clarify why the different approach to the framing of the qualifications question.

The fourth point is really a point about the formatting of the regulations. Now, this point is easier to explain by looking at Schedule 1 to the regulations. So, maybe I could ask Members to go to pack-page 28. 

10:05

There you will see that the text in the second column does not align horizontally with the text in the first column. So, for example, you might think that the third paragraph down in column 2 corresponds to the paragraph just to the left in column 1, that is the paragraph that refers to article 5(11) of the census Order, but it doesn't. And while you can work all of this out by reading the regulations in detail themselves, we think that clearer alignment of the paragraphs in Schedule 1 would give you the answer at a glance.

The fifth and final merits point notes differences between the online versions and the paper versions of certain questionnaires and some examples are given on pack-page 3. The merits point suggests that collecting different answers to the same question, depending on whether the question was asked online or on paper, may impact on the quality of the data and that, in turn, may impact on the policy objective of collecting detailed information about the Welsh population. 

Okay, thank you, Gareth. And we haven't yet had a response from Government in response to those, which are very technical points. Dai Lloyd, any comments?

Na, hapus i nodi'r adroddiad cynhwysfawr yna, fel dŷn ni newydd glywed. 

No, happy to note the comprehensive report that we've just heard. 

Okay, we move on to, then, the next item. Thank you for that, Gareth, and for that very detailed consideration of what is a very long and complex document.

3. SL(5)553 - Rheoliadau Taliadau i Ffermwyr (Rheolaethau a Gwiriadau) (Cymru) (Coronafeirws) 2020
3. SL(5)553 – The Payments to Farmers (Controls and Checks) (Wales) (Coronavirus) Regulations 2020

We move on to the Payments to Farmers (Controls and Checks) (Wales) (Coronavirus) Regulations 2020. I have again a report, regulations and the explanatory memorandum. And in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, these are regulations that reduce the minimum inspection and control rates in respect of applications for various payments, under the 2020 basic payment scheme, in line with EU law. Whilst Senedd lawyers have noted no points for reporting under Standing Order 21.2 and 21.3, they have identified implications as a result of the UK's exit from the European Union. Gareth, do you want to add anything further to that? 

Yes. The draft report on pack-page 133 notes that the direct payments to farmers scheme is now a matter of domestic law and therefore EU law changes in this area no longer automatically apply in the United Kingdom during the current implementation periods. Therefore, to mirror any changes that have been made at EU level, domestic legislation, such as these regulations, is required.

Okay. So, that's something that we can monitor. Dai Lloyd, any comments?  

Na, dim byd yn ychwanegol. 

No, nothing to add. 

4. Adroddiad Rheol Sefydlog 30B: Deddf yr Undeb Ewropeaidd (Ymadael) a Fframweithiau Cyffredin
4. Standing Order 30B Report: The European Union (Withdrawal) Act and Common Frameworks

We'll move on to item 4: the Standing Order 30B report—the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and Common Frameworks. And, again, you have the written statement and a report. Now, the European Union (Withdrawal Act) 2018 requires the UK Government to report periodically to the UK Parliament on matters relating to common frameworks and the use of section 12. These are the so-called 'freezing powers' to temporarily maintain existing EU law limits on devolved competence.

The Welsh Government's written statement of 2 June notified Senedd Members of the seventh report, which covers the period from 26 December 2019 to 25 March 2020. I suppose the important point here is, of course, that the report notes that the UK Government has not sought to bring forward any section 12 regulations to date. And the report also notes that several frameworks have completed formal review processes at official level. So, that's really to note. Dai Lloyd, any comments?

5. Datganiadau ysgrifenedig o dan Reol Sefydlog 30C
5. Written statements under Standing Order 30C

We then move on to written statements under Standing Order 30C. We have the Environment (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020. The Welsh Government's written statement provides notification that it has consented to the making of the Environment (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020 by UK Ministers. These are regulations that amend some 30 pieces of EU legislation that apply in Wales. They seek to address the failures of retained EU law to operate effectively and other deficiencies arising from the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. The written statement notes that the Welsh Government has fully considered the amendments and believes there is no divergence in policy. Senedd lawyers have noted one issue in the commentary document relating to the Welsh Government's written statement. So, we go over to you, Gareth, again.

10:10

Diolch. These regulations allow the Welsh Ministers to continue to exercise certain environmental powers, and the Welsh Government's written statement says that, under these UK Government regulations, certain environmental powers can be exercised by the Welsh Ministers after exit day, which was on 31 January of this year. However, the powers can actually be used after the implementation period, which ends on 31 December of this year. So, the reference to 'exit day' in the written statement should actually be a reference to the end of the implementation period.

Na, cytuno efo hynna. Diolch.

No, I agree with that. Thank you.

6. Papurau i’w nodi
6. Papers to note

Okay, we move on then to papers to note. Item 6.1, the letter from the Counsel General—making justice work in Wales. I think this is a letter, just prior to the evidence session, which, of course, we have later on. There were certain items mentioned in there that I felt necessary to respond to with regard to the way the committee is operating, and we'll be looking at some of the issues. So, I just suggest that if there are any matters arising from this, we can discuss them in private session. Okay.

We move on, then, to the letter from the First Minister to the Llywydd. This is on the Senedd and Elections Act 2020. We're invited to note the letter from the First Minister to the Llywydd. There are matters here, obviously, we can discuss in private session, but essentially they relate to the funding arrangements for the Electoral Commission—a certain impasse needs to be resolved to maintain the independence and accountability issues with regard to those payments. Can I suggest, if there are any issues that we want to raise, we'll take those up in private session? Is that okay?

In which case we move on to 6.3, a letter from the Chair of the European Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee—correspondence to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. It's a letter dated 9 June 2020, a letter we're invited to note. The letter relates to the UK's engagement with the Welsh Government during the remaining stages of the UK-EU future relationship negotiations. Again, if there are any issues there, shall we defer those to private session?

Okay. And then our next item is the letter of 9 June 2020 from the Minister for Finance and Trefnydd on UK-wide statutory instruments—Direct Payments to Farmers (Amendment) Regulations 2020. Again, a letter we're invited to note in relation to the UK-wide statutory instrument that has been made and the powers set out in the Direct Payments to Farmers (Legislative Continuity) Act 2020. Can we note that?

Okay, we're going to move on to the next item, which is letter from the Minister for Finance and Trefnydd: UK-wide statutory instrument—the Direct Payments (Ceilings) Regulations 2020. Again, another letter to note in respect of a statutory instrument made under the Direct Payments to Farmers (Legislative Continuity) Act. Shall we note that, and if there are any issues, they can be raised in private session? Is that okay?

7. Cynnig o dan Reol Sefydlog 17.42 i benderfynu gwahardd y cyhoedd o’r cyfarfod ar gyfer eitemau 8, 9 a 10
7. Motion under Standing Order 17.42 to resolve to exclude the public from the meeting for Items 8, 9 and 10

Cynnig:

bod y pwyllgor yn penderfynu gwahardd y cyhoedd o’r cyfarfod ar gyfer eitemau 8, 9 a 10, o dan Reol Sefydlog 17.42.

Motion:

that the committee resolves to exclude the public from the meeting for items 8, 9 and 10, under Standing Order 17.42. 

Cynigiwyd y cynnig.

Motion moved.

We've come to the end of those items for the moment, then, so in accordance with Standing Order 17.42(vi), I invite the committee to resolve to exclude the public from items 8, 9 and 10. Are Members agreed with moving to private session?

Derbyniwyd y cynnig.

Daeth rhan gyhoeddus y cyfarfod i ben am 10:14.

Motion agreed.

The public part of the meeting ended at 10:14.

11:10

Ailymgynullodd y pwyllgor yn gyhoeddus am 11:12.

The committee reconvened in public at 11:12.

11. Y newid yng nghyfansoddiad Cymru: Sesiwn dystiolaeth 6
11. Wales's changing constitution: Evidence session 6

I welcome everyone back to the meeting of the Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee. I'd like to welcome David Melding, who's standing in in place of Suzy Davies. I remind everyone that all mobile devices should be switched to the silent mode. We're operating through the medium of Welsh and English languages and interpretation is available. The sound operators are controlling the microphones and, as such, you do not need to mute and unmute yourself during the public meeting. 

Can I welcome to this sixth evidence session on Wales's changing constitution Jeremy Miles, Counsel General, Des Clifford, director general, office of the First Minister, and Chris Warner, deputy director of constitutional affairs and inter-governmental relations? I think we'll go straight into questions, if that's okay with you, Counsel General.

We'll start off with a few questions inevitably about the Sewel convention. It is almost nine months to the day that you gave evidence on this, on 16 September 2019. A lot has happened since then, including leaving the European Union. The First Minister, of course, gave evidence on this on 13 January 2020 and, indeed, the Secretary of State for Wales on 9 March 2020.

Counsel General, on 16 September when we were discussing the issue of possibly leaving the EU and the legislation going ahead without the consent of the devolved Governments, which is, in fact, what's happened, you described Sewel as a constitutional flashpoint, and the First Minister described the Sewel convention as basically leading to an arbitrary and unilateral power in respect of the UK Government. The Secretary of State for Wales described passing the legislation without the consent of the devolved Governments and in relation to Sewel as a major exceptional circumstance  unlikely ever to be repeated.  Then, in the most recent statement from yourself—a Plenary statement—you did describe the signs from the UK Government as encouraging signs from the UK Government in respect of Sewel.

I was just wondering if you could outline where you see the Sewel convention now within our constitutional structure—what relevance it really has.

11:15
Member
Jeremy Miles 11:15:30
Counsel General and Minister for European Transition

[Inaudible.]

Counsel General, sorry, we need to wait for you to be unmuted. I think that there's normally a short delay. Can we unmute the Counsel General, please?

I think that we still need to unmute the Counsel General. There we are. I think we're unmuted now. Thank you.

Forgive me, Chair—I think that that was my fault. Apologies for that.

The key point, I guess, in the last few months was the response to the decisions of the three legislatures to withhold consent in relation to the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill as it was. Obviously, if the purpose of the convention was to give you absolute protection for devolved competence, then plainly it didn't and doesn't do that. Yet, proceeding in those circumstances obviously is a very significant constitutional moment. The day after that, of course, we, as I said, gave consent to the Direct Payments to Farmers (Legislative Continuity) Bill. So, I think that both the Welsh Government and the UK Government were keen that the decision around the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 didn't become a constitutional crisis.

I think that the circumstances in which that Bill was considered were different, actually, from the circumstance in which the withdrawal Bill had been considered, and I think that the UK Government's response was different, in this sense. The First Minister described the actions around the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 as corrosive, and I think that that is essentially about the fact that the UK Government, at that time, took no note, if you like, of the Scottish Parliament's withholding of consent. That isn't quite what happened in relation to the withdrawal agreement Act. In that situation, there was an attempt on the part of the UK Government to address the points that we had made as a Government in terms of the reforms that ought to happen to the convention. 

So, for example, Lord Callanan made a statement in the House of Lords on the Third Reading. There was a written statement by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and correspondence, of course, from UK Government Ministers around the circumstances in which the UK Government had chosen to proceed, notwithstanding the withholding of consent. So, would we say that those actions met the tests that we had set for reform of the Sewel convention? No. But, were they small steps in the right direction? Yes. 

The fundamental point remains, of course, around what are circumstances in which it can be said to be 'not normal'. I don't think that the events around the withdrawal agreement Bill have taken this very much forward in relation to that. In the correspondence from Stephen Barclay, there was an attempt to make it clear that these were very exceptional circumstances. I think that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster used similar language. So, there was certainly an attempt to minimise the scope of 'not normally'. But, as you know, Chair, and as the committee will know, our position as a Government is that that test ought to be very much more closely defined, if you like, and codified—and codified in statute—so that it provides a more rational basis for very, very important decisions of that nature to be taken.

Do you share a concern that this committee has had, which is a sequel to events around Sewel, particularly in areas of healthcare, fisheries, agriculture, the World Trade Organization agreement on agriculture, et cetera—that the UK Government is still not complying with Sewel in the sense that where there are disputes over consent or competence, the fallback position has increasingly become memoranda of understanding? This committee has, of course, expressed a view that we consider memoranda of understanding as a very inadequate alternative to proper legislation. Do you see that as a consequence of the undermining of Sewel in recent months?

11:20

I don't draw that connection myself, Chair, and I don't think it's a question of the UK Government not proceeding with provisions in Bills because it can hope to do that by agreement, as it were. Obviously, our position as a Government is that we would much prefer to have provisions on the face of a Bill, for reasons that we will all understand, but, where that isn't possible, then I think the availability of inter-governmental agreements is an important way of delineating the obligations of the parties, and doing that in a way that is, you know, from a relationship of parity and ought to be transparent. So, I'm not suggesting it's a fully adequate alternative, obviously, but I think, in circumstances, it's an effective tool for us to be able to use. 

Sewel, of course, remains a statutory convention now, but the issue of justiciability is very much still in question. Is its Welsh Government's view that Sewel needs to become justiciable, and, in order for it to become justiciable, there probably needs to be at least a disputes mechanism, which could then ultimately provide a mechanism for some form of constitutional determination?

Yes, our position as a Government is that it ought to be the circumstances in which that test should apply or to be set out or to be codifed, and for that to be in statute, which then would make it capable of judicial oversight in the way that you describe. I mean, there's a more radical reform to Sewel, which I think the case is very strongly made for, which is just to take a red line through the word 'normally' in that provision that appears in the Act, which I think would take us into much clearer territory.

That takes us onto the next series of questions. I go to Carwyn Jones.

Thank you, Chair. Good morning, Counsel General. I'd like to explore this issue of 'not normal'—the terminology that is used. It strikes me that it would be very difficult to suggest that was justiciable. The courts are historically very reluctant to intervene in what they describe as matters of policy, but the way in which the decision was taken to override the views of the National Assembly, as we were then, and the Scottish Parliament, might be interpreted as the UK Government taking the view that 'not normal' means where a different view is taken by the devolved legislatures. And the difficulty is, without there being a more defined definition, it's very difficult to know how this use of 'not normal' might develop in the future. I don't think the courts will touch it. This is the problem of having a constitution that's really a network of conventions that apparently is so good that the UK did not export it to any of its former dominions; instead they had written constitutions. But, from your perspective, what does 'not normal' mean? Perhaps that's not a question that any of us can answer, but would you anticipate that being used as a reason to override the views of the devolved legislatures in the future? 

Well, as formulated, it is capable of doing that. You know, that is the fundamental principle behind it essentially, isn't it, which is the principle of parliamentary supremacy? I and, I know, you as well regard that principle as being something that has outlived its usefulness, but that is the basic principle that is the foundation to the convention. How do you go about defining 'not normally'? Well, I think that's classically something that you'd want to develop, obviously, in discussion, you know, across the four Governments. I take some comfort from the language used in the letters from UK Government Ministers in response to the events around the withdrawal agreement Bill; they clearly were talking about singular, specific and exceptional circumstances. So, you know, only the most narrow definition on one reading of it. You might think that those sorts of circumstances would be limited to matters of national security, perhaps, or threats to life—you know, those sorts of circumstances. But I think the key point is that it ought to be set out so that we're all able to see what the circumstances might be that could apply. Now, is it possible to construct an argument that the events around leaving the European Union in that direct sense constitute 'not normal' circumstances? It's clearly possible to make that argument, but we shouldn't be in a situation where we're speculating about whether these things are normal or not; we should all be able to look at something that describes the circumstances transparently.

11:25

There's another issue, of course, that affects us particularly in Wales, and that is the fact that, in previous years, we've had disputes as to whether a particular matter is within the competence of the Assembly. We've had issues, for example, when the UK Government has ignored LCMs from the Assembly because there have been different views on whether the matter was within the competence of—now, of course—the Senedd. The trouble I have with the whole concept is that it is an excuse for any UK Government to do as it wishes by simply declaring that something is 'not normal'.

What alternatives have you looked at in terms of how that might be improved in the future? A tighter definition would help, constitutional change would help, but would you agree there certainly needs to be some way of ensuring that there is greater understanding of when the UK Parliament might legislate and when it might not? Simply saying 'not normal' is simply not good enough, in my view.

Well, I certainly agree with that. As I say, there's a case for the principle to be replaced by the UK Parliament not legislating where matters are devolved, but, if we're in the territory of what 'not normally' means, I absolutely think that we should have that, as you say, stipulated, and I think there needs to be, alongside that capability, the judicial oversight, if you like, on the one hand, which is about defining it more closely, and giving it a statutory footing—on the other side, there needs to be a much strengthened and a much better mechanism for Parliament to take cognisance of what the devolved legislatures are saying. So, there was, as I say, a statement at the reading, but there ought to be, as a matter of course when these situations arise, a statement in both Houses, explaining why the Government is recommending to Parliament that it should proceed despite the withholding of consent by the legislatures, so that Parliament can have that in mind and have that debated in making the decision to proceed, if it does, and there also needs to be a mechanism whereby the devolved legislatures also can make a statement to Parliament through UK Government Ministers, so that all that information is available to parliamentarians when they make a decision on whether to proceed or not in the absence of consent. That seems to me a very pragmatic and rational way of trying to make the convention as it is now function more effectively.

Diolch, Cadeirydd. Bore da, Gweinidog. Ar yr un trywydd, a dweud y gwir, achos dŷn ni'n licio manion technegol yn y pwyllgor yma, allaf i bellach ofyn i chi: allwch chi egluro pryd yn ystod y broses gwnaethoch chi gytunio y dylai penderfyniad gan Senedd y Deyrnas Unedig i fwrw ymlaen efo'r Ddeddf cytundeb ymadael â'r Undeb Ewropeaidd gael ei neilltuo fel achos arbennig? Pryd yn ystod y broses yna gwnaethoch chi gytuno â hynny? Ac ymhellach i hynny, beth oeddech chi'n ei olygu yn eich datganiad ar 25 Chwefror pan ddywedoch chi bod angen i Lywodraeth Cymru adeiladu ar y penderfyniad i neilltuo'r Ddeddf fel achos arbennig? Achos, yn naturiol, gwrthododd Senedd Cymru roi cydsyniad, ac eto rydych chi'n dweud bod angen i Lywodraeth Cymru adeiladu ar gael ei hanwybyddu gan Senedd y Deyrnas Unedig, felly beth fydd yn digwydd?

Thank you very much, Chair. Good morning, Counsel General. On that same topic, because we do like to discuss technical issues on this committee, may I further ask you whether you can explain when, during the process, you agreed that the decision by the UK Parliament to proceed with the EU withdrawal agreement Act should be ring-fenced as a special case? When in that process did you agree on that? And further to that, what did you mean in your statement on 25 February when you said that the Welsh Government needed to build on the decision to ring-fence the Act as a special case? Because Welsh Parliament refused to give its consent, and yet you say that the Welsh Government needs to build on being ignored by the UK Parliament, so what will happen?

Wel, jest i fod yn glir am y pwynt cyntaf, penderfyniad Llywodraeth y Deyrnas Gyfunol oedd penderfynu nad oedd hi'n sefyllfa normal—hynny yw, doedd e ddim yn normal—nid penderfyniad Llywodraeth Cymru. Felly, doedd dim cwestiwn ein bod ni'n ymwneud â'r penderfyniad o'u rhan nhw a bod cytundeb dros hynny.

Ond rŷch chi'n gofyn beth oedd y meddylfryd tu ôl i'r penderfyniad i ddisgrifio hwn fel achos arbennig. Wel, yn sgil—. Fel gwnes i ddweud yn gynharach, roedd potensial i hyn ddatblygu yn rhywbeth ehangach na ddylai fe fod ac na fyddai ym muddiannau Cymru iddo fe fod. Ac ar sail y ffaith bod y Gweinidogion yn Llywodraeth y Deyrnas Gyfunol wedi ysgrifennu i ddisgrifio, o'u safbwynt nhw, mai sail gynnil i'r weithred oedd—hynny yw, bod y sefyllfa yn un arbennig iawn yn eu barn nhw—roedd e'n taro ni fel Llywodraeth ei fod e'n bwysig, felly, i sicrhau mai'r egwyddor honno oedd yn gweithredu, ac mai sail gynnil iawn oedd i'r confensiwn. Ac yn y cyd-destun hwnnw efallai wedyn gwnes i ddisgrifio fe fel achos arbennig—hynny yw, bod y sail yn un eithriadol, felly, i'r cam oedd wedi cael ei gymryd.

Doedden ni ddim eisiau—a dwi'n credu y byddai'r rhan fwyaf ohonom ni'n cytuno â hyn—i'r ffaith bod y Llywodraeth wedi argymell hynny yn San Steffan, er gwaethaf bod dim cydsyniad yma yng Nghymru, ddod yn egwyddor weithredol ehangach. Fuasai hynny, wrth gwrs, ddim wedi bod yn dderbyniol inni i gyd. Felly, ymgais oedd e i sicrhau mai impact cynnil fyddai i'r penderfyniad.

Just to be clear on the first point, it was the decision of the UK Government to decide that this wasn't a normal situation—that is, that it was not normal—it wasn't a decision made by the Welsh Government. So, there was no question of us being involved in agreement on the decision.

But you asked what the thinking was behind the decision to describe this as a special case. Well—. As I said earlier, there was potential for this to develop into a wider issue than it would have been, and it wouldn't have been in the interest of Wales for that to happen. And on the basis of the fact that Ministers in the UK Government had written to describe, from their stance, that there was a limited basis for the actions—that is, that this was a very particular situation in their opinion—that struck us as a Government as important, therefore, to ensure that that principle operated, and that there was a very limited basis to the convention. And it was in that context that I described it as a special case—that is, that it was an exceptional case, therefore, that the action had been taken.

We didn't want—and I think that most of us would agree with this—the fact that the Government had recommended that in Westminster, despite the fact there was no consent here in Wales, to become a wider operating principle. That, of course, wouldn't have been acceptable to us. So, it was an attempt to ensure that there would be a limited impact with regard to the decision.

11:30

Diolch am hynna. Ac eto yng nghyd-destun Sewel, achos dyna ydy'r rhan yma o'r cwestiynau, sut ydych chi'n ymateb i sylw Ysgrifennydd Gwladol Cymru bod y penderfyniad nad oedd amgylchiadau normal yn berthnasol i'r Ddeddf cytundeb ymadael â'r Undeb Ewropeaidd wedi'i wneud yn dilyn trafodaethau efo chi fel Llywodraeth Cymru er mwyn cadw Sewel fel y mae?

Thank you for that. Again, in the context of Sewel, because that is what we're focusing on in this section, how do you respond to the comment made by the Secretary of State for Wales that the decision that normal circumstances did not apply to the EU withdrawal agreement Act was made following discussions with Welsh Government in order to keep Sewel intact?

Wel, fel gwnes i ddweud, mae trafodaethau wastad yng nghyd-destun Mesur sydd wedi dod ymlaen â'r confensiwn. Mae hynny'n digwydd yn rheolaidd. Ond dyw e ddim—. Nid y sefyllfa oedd ein bod ni'n ymwneud â'r penderfyniad a chytuno gyda nhw doedd y peth ddim yn normal. Ond, wrth gwrs, mae trafodaethau wastad yn digwydd rhwng y Llywodraethau ynglŷn â gweithredu'r confensiwn.

Well, as I said, there are always discussions in the context of a Bill that has come forward in accordance with the convention. That happens regularly. But it wasn't the case that we were involved in the decision or agreed that it wasn't normal. But discussions always happen between Governments with regard to the convention.

Just one final question, then, on Sewel from myself before we move on to inter-governmental relations. The Secretary of State for Wales, when he gave evidence to us, said that he did not consider that Sewel was dead and needed to be rebirthed in some other form. He was clearly satisfied with Sewel as it existed. 

Just two points to you, really, on this: is this really an indication that the UK Government is in denial about the relevance of Sewel now, and, with events around COVID—and I know there'll be other questions about COVID-19 and the impact there—that we've really moved on from Sewel and from devolution into the whole new concept of four-nation government? Does it concern you, therefore, that, certainly from the Secretary of State for Wales, the UK Government position does not seem to be that there is anything wrong with the current arrangements and they can continue as they are?

Yes, obviously, the Government—we don't agree with that. The UK Government is absolutely aware of our position. 'Reforming our Union' in autumn of last year set this out in detail, but we've been advocating for reform of Sewel for a lot longer than that. As I say, I think the conversation and discussion we've had this morning amply illustrates why the convention needs to be reformed and why the small steps, as I described them, in relation to the withdrawal agreement Bill need to be built upon. There needs to be now, as I said earlier, a fuller opportunity for Parliament to consider the withholding of consent and the codified version of it with statutory footing.

Thank you for that, Counsel General, if we can move on now to inter-governmental relations. Carwyn Jones.

Thank you, Chair. Many years of experience with inter-governmental relations taught me that the JMC is often little more than a sounding board for complaints. The JMC plenary, particularly, was a place where we all went to complain to the UK Government, who nodded sagely at us, and very little tended to happen as a result. The shame is that it could be far more than that. Of course, it could be a forum where decisions are taken, a kind of British Council of Ministers, if you like, but that's never happened. And that's been the case—and we've got 17 years of experience—that was the case regardless of who was actually in charge of the UK Government, I have to say.

From your perspective, where are we in terms of—? Well, first of all, could you give your view, Counsel General, on the current state of inter-governmental relations, and, secondly, could you update the committee on progress of any reforms to the current machinery of inter-governmental relations?

11:35

Well, taken broadly, if you like—. Well, firstly, relations with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive are strong—I would describe them as strong. You know, with the UK Government, relations are patchier. They're patchy, I suppose.

At the very end of last week, you saw examples of an announcement being made in relation to border checks that dealt extensively with aspects of devolved competence and on which the Government here was not consulted before the decision was made. On Friday you saw a joint letter from the two First Ministers of Wales and Scotland going and, really, not getting the response and consideration that I'm sure most of us would wish they had. So, there are examples of poor relationships in that sense.

But, if you were to also look at the early stages of COVID in particular and the co-ordination of emergency response, I would describe those as positive. So, I think the key point in all of these things is that I ought to be able to say to you, 'We don't always agree, but, basically, there's a functioning set of mechanisms and relationships that carry us through both benign times and the choppier waters that we've been in more recently', but, you know, your description of the JMC is one that I would endorse. It is not what is required and 'Brexit and Devolution' obviously sets out an alternative view for how that might be developed in future.

Now, on the question of progress in relation to the inter-governmental review, we've been pressing very hard for progress in this area. We absolutely see very clearly, plainly, the need for reform and urgent reform. The review was launched—. The review of inter-governmental relations is now more than two years old, with very little to show.

Now, we have made progress in relation to principles that Welsh Government officials have led on, and, in the last JMC(EN), which was a virtual one, I pushed strongly on the resumption of the review. And, actually, that was agreed, and there have been project board meetings since then, so that's positive.

And I've also pressed and had support from the other devolved Governments for the discussions around the dispute resolution—dispute avoidance and resolution—to be prioritised. I would like us to be in a position, and officials are certainly working to this, for proposals around dispute avoidance and resolution to be brought back before Ministers in the coming weeks. I think that will be important. They're relevant in all sorts of ways that we've just alluded to, and they're going to become more important as we leave the transition period. So, I hope that we'll be able to make progress in relation to that aspect sooner rather than later. Certainly, it's possible to do that with will.

We're going to turn now to the dispute resolution process, a particular bête noire of mine. Where two parties wish to go to court to resolve a dispute, the dispute resolution process is equivalent to one party also being the judge, and not only one party also being the judge, but that party also being able to determine whether or not there's a dispute at all, and we saw that with the Northern Ireland £1 billion that was given when the UK Government denied there was any dispute in the first place, therefore, there was no need to engage the dispute resolution process. Now, in any other sphere of life, that would be the most egregious breach of natural justice imaginable—any court would strike it down—yet here we are. It's also, to my mind, a misreading of the constitutional position. It's possible to argue that parliamentary supremacy exists, although the extent of it—well, that's for another day. But Executive supremacy doesn't exist. The UK Government is not supreme over other Governments in the UK.

There was a proposal, some years ago—probably 10 or 12 years ago now—that there would be an independent tribunal that would adjudicate between Governments. It would be made up of—senior members of the House of Lords was one example. The UK Government decided it didn't want to support that at the time. So, where are we in terms of reforming the dispute-resolution process so that there is equity between different parties, and where the UK Government is not a party and a judge in disputes that it's involved in?

11:40

Well, the question you've asked there and the question you asked earlier around when Sewel is applied, I think, have a common theme, if I may suggest, which is that we ought not to be in a situation where it's entirely within the gift of one party to designate the circumstances in which pretty fundamental constitutional principles apply or don't apply. What we ought to have is a rules-based system, if you like, that is equitable, transparent and fairly reached. I think that's the point that applies here as well, isn't it? We need to have a mechanism, such as what the Government set out in 'Brexit and Devolution', coming up to three years ago now, which is that there should be an objective element to this. Now, that's a very big step, actually. It's an important step and I think it's the right step, but it is a big step in constitutional terms.

I think that element of objectivity can mean different things at different points in the discussions between Governments. So, in some cases, it may be taking account of independent advice that is published and part of the decision-making process and responded to openly. You might see circumstances where there's arbitration between Governments in relation to particular items of deadlock, seeking an arbitrated outcome. And then, where you've got circumstances where Governments have signed up to agreed principles or to behave in agreed ways, you can imagine those circumstances being subject to independent adjudication—they engage principles that Governments will have agreed democratically, openly and transparently, and when those things are tested, you can see a stronger version of independence being brought into the process. I think that's an important aspect of this.

I don't know whether we will be able to agree that with the other Governments. I'm hoping that that will be a feature of what we look at as Ministers in the coming weeks. Certainly, I think that's important for the reasons that you've just outlined.

Very quickly from me then, do you think that the dispute-resolution process needs statutory underpinning or can it be done through agreement?

I think in a rational world, all these things would be underpinned by statute, wouldn't they? But the key point at this stage is to get a set of agreed principles that are observed and function and constrain Governments—all the Governments—in their actions when it comes to managing disputes.

Okay. Thank you. I'm going to go to Dai Lloyd just in a moment. I'm aware I missed one item that David Melding was going to ask. I'll ask David to raise an important issue when he's brought in later on in the debate, if that's okay. If I can move on to Dai Lloyd.

Diolch yn fawr, Gadeirydd. Yn nhermau cytundebau rhynglywodraethol, yn eich llythyr atom ni fis Tachwedd diwethaf, fe nodwyd gennych pan fo cysylltiad rhwng cytundebau rhynglywodraethol â deddfwriaeth sylfaenol ac mae cydsyniad y Senedd yn cael ei geisio ar ei chyfer, y byddai disgwyl gweld y Senedd yma yn ystyried cytundebau o'r fath fel rhan o'i gwaith craffu deddfwriaethol arferol. Pam felly nad yw'r Senedd yma wedi gallu ystyried y cytundebau rhynglywodraethol sy'n gysylltiedig efo'r Mesur Amaethyddiaeth a'r Mesur Pysgodfeydd?

Thank you very much, Chair. In terms of inter-governmental agreements, in your letter to us in November, you stated that where inter-governmental agreements are linked to primary legislation for which the Senedd's consent is sought, you would expect this Senedd to consider such agreements as part of its usual legislative scrutiny. So, why hasn't this Senedd been able to consider the inter-governmental agreements associated with the Agriculture Bill and the Fisheries Bill?

Jest i fod yn glir am yr egwyddor sydd wrth wraidd hyn, mae'r broses o gytuno cytundebau rhynglywodraethol yn broses sydd, yn gwbl anorfod, ddim o dan ein rheolaeth unigol ni fel Llywodraeth. Mae hynny, wrth gwrs, yn amlwg. Felly, ble bynnag mae'n bosibl i'r cytundebau yma fod ar gael, dylen nhw fod ar gael, ond dyw'r broses honno ddim wastad o fewn ein rheolaeth ni, fel rwy'n dweud. Mae'r amserlenni negodi ar gyfer rhain yn gallu bod yn rhai brys iawn, ac felly dyw'r broses o graffu ar y pethau yma wrth eu bod nhw'n cael eu trafod ddim wastad yn caniatáu'r math o graffu buasech chi, ac efallai deddfwrfeydd yn gyffredinol, yn gweld yn elfen hanfodol. Wrth gwrs, mae'n elfen bwysig i ni gymryd mewn i ystyriaeth. Mae'r Prif Weinidog wedi ysgrifennu o fewn y dyddiau diwethaf i'r pwyllgor i ddweud, o fewn yr amgylchiadau anodd hynny, fod ymroddiad ar ran y Llywodraeth i roi rhybudd i'r Senedd am yr angen ar gyfer cytundebau o'r math yma, ac i rannu'r hyn ŷn ni'n gallu gwneud, y mwyaf y gallwn ni, o ran gwybodaeth, fel bod y wybodaeth honno ar gael i'w chraffu.

Ond roeddech chi'n sôn am y Bil Amaeth; mae'r cytundeb hwnnw wedi cael ei gyhoeddi ar ein gwefan ni, ac rwy'n credu bod y Gweinidog wedi ateb cwestiynau ar y cytundeb. Mae hi wrthi baratoi ymatebion i ymchwiliadau gan y pwyllgor hwn a'r pwyllgor amaeth ar hyn. Felly, rwy'n credu bod cyfle wedi bod i graffu ar hwnnw. O ran y Mesur Pysgodfeydd, mae gohirio wedi bod yn y broses honno yn sgil COVID, yn anffodus, ond mae ymroddiad wedi cael ei roi bod cytundeb, a bod y cytundeb yn disgrifio, er enghraifft, defnydd cymal 23 yn y Bil ynglŷn ag ymgynghori â Llywodraeth Cymru cyn gwneud penderfyniadau.

Just to be clear about the principle behind this, the process of agreeing inter-governmental agreements is a process that, inevitably, isn't under our individual control as a Government. That's obvious. So, wherever it's possible for these agreements to be made available, they should be made available, but that process isn't always within our control, as I was saying. The negotiation timetables for these can be very tight, so the process of scrutinising these things as they are being discussed doesn't always allow us to have the kind of scrutiny that you, and possibly legislatures in general, would see as being vital. It's of course an important element for us to consider. The First Minister has written in the past few days to the committee to say that within the circumstances, these very difficult circumstances, there is a commitment from the Government to give the Senedd notice of these kinds of agreements, and to share what we can, and as much as we can, so that that information is available for scrutiny.

But you spoke about the Agriculture Bill; well, that agreement has been published on our website, and I believe that the Minister has responded to questions on the agreement. She is preparing responses to inquiries by this committee and the agriculture committee on this issue. So I think there has been opportunity to scrutinise that. In terms of the Fisheries Bill, there has been a postponement in that process as a result of COVID, unfortunately, but a commitment has been made that there will be an agreement and that the agreement will describe, for example, the use of clause 23 in the Bill with regard to engaging with the Welsh Government before decisions are made.

11:45

Diolch am hynna. Ac yn fwy cyffredinol, efallai, allwch chi olrhain dull presennol Llywodraeth Cymru o ddeddfu ar gyfer Brexit, a chadarnhau a fydd Llywodraeth Cymru yn deddfu mewn meysydd datganoledig yn hytrach na dibynnu ar Lywodraeth y Deyrnas Unedig i wneud hynny?

Thank you for that. And more generally, could you set out the Welsh Government's current approach to legislating for Brexit, and confirm whether the Welsh Government will legislate in devolved areas rather than relying on the UK Government to do so?

Wel, bydd cryn lwyth o ddeddfwriaeth o'n blaenau ni ar gyfer gadael y cyfnod pontio: deddfau cynradd, fel rŷn ni wedi trafod eisoes, ond hefyd lot fawr o ddeddfu eilradd. Felly, mae hynny yn delio â'r cyfnod yma a'r newidiadau i gyfraith Ewropeaidd ar hyn o bryd—sicrhau bod y rheini yn dod mewn i effaith; newid o ran y cyfnod pontio—newidiadau sy'n cydnabod bod cyfnod pontio wedi bod, felly; a hefyd rheoliadau i ddelio â'r regimes newydd ar ôl gadael y cyfnod pontio; a hefyd, wrth gwrs, gwireddu elfennau'r cytundeb ymadael. Ac mae'r rheini heb sôn am elfennau sy'n delio ag unrhyw gytundeb gyda'r Undeb Ewropeaidd, os bydd cytundeb, ac unrhyw gytundeb gyda gwledydd eraill o ran masnach rydd. Felly, mae ystod eang o ddeddfu ar y gorwel.

Dŷn ni ddim, erbyn hyn, yn anffodus, yn dal yn glir beth yw'r maint—faint ohonyn nhw fydd. Ond yn sicr, bydd cannoedd, ac o fewn cyfnod llawer byrrach nag oedd gyda ni yn 2019 i baratoi ar gyfer gadael ar ddiwedd y flwyddyn. Ein bwriad ni, wrth gwrs, yw parhau â'r egwyddorion y gwnaethom ni eu parchu ar gyfer y broses yn 2019: hynny yw, bod deddfwriaeth yng Nghymru yn cael ei newid gan y Senedd yma yng Nghymru, ond hefyd, pan nad oes anghydfod gwleidyddol neu wahaniaeth gwleidyddol, jest o ran y broses o allu sicrhau bod hyn yn digwydd o gwbl, bydd amgylchiadau lle byddwn yn gofyn i Lywodraeth y Deyrnas Gyfunol i ddeddfu ar ein rhan ni. Ond, fel rwy'n dweud, nid i newid deddfau sydd wedi'u creu yma yng Nghymru, a bydd o fewn yr egwyddorion y gwnaethon ni gytuno—hynny yw, bod cydsyniad yn cael ei roi i hynny ar bob achos.

Well, there will be a whole host of legislation in front of us with regard to exiting the transition period, and it will be primary legislation, as we've already discussed, but also a great deal of subordinate legislation. So, that deals with this period and the changes to European law at this time—to ensure that they come into effect; changes in terms of the transition period—changes that recognise that the transition period has taken place; and regulations to deal with the new regimes after exiting the transition period; and also, of course, to enact elements of the withdrawal agreement. And that's not to mention elements regarding any agreement with the European Union, if one should come into being, and with regard to other countries in terms of free trade. So, there's a wide range of legislation on the horizon.

Unfortunately, we're still not entirely clear how much there will be, but there will certainly be a great deal, and within a far shorter period than we would have anticipated in 2019 for exiting at the end of that year. Our intention is to continue with the principles that we respected for the process in 2019: namely, that legislation in Wales should be amended by the Senedd here in Wales, but also, where there is no dispute in political terms, just in terms of the process of ensuring that this can happen, there will be circumstances where we will ask the UK Government to legislate on our behalf. But, as I say, that won't be with regard to legislation made here in Wales, and it will be within the principles that we agreed—that is, that consent should be given to that on every occasion.

Diolch. Dwi'n ymwybodol o'r amser, so gwnaf aros yn fanna, Cadeirydd. Diolch.

Thank you. I'm aware of the time, so I will pause there. Thank you, Chair.

I was going to ask some questions with regard to the dispute resolution mechanism. You've dealt with those, so I'll go straight on to David Melding.

Diolch yn fawr, Cadeirydd. I apologise for taking you back to the Sewel convention question, Counsel General, but it seems to me that, as a result of your correspondence, your exchange of correspondence with the UK Government, you've now established that any non-appliance of the Sewel convention requires exceptional, singular and unique circumstances. Now, that's an incredibly high test. What on earth do you think could be more explicit than that, that it really has to be something that is just out of the usual constitutional orbit? It seems to me that any definition you could make by way of statute would have less force than these exceptionally restrictive terms. 

11:50

Well, that is why I described earlier the process of building on that. I do recognise, as I think I said, that that does describe a tighter version of the convention than the words 'not normally'. I think that does take us in the right direction. But at the end of the day—and I don’t mean to diminish it, genuinely—they are a set of adjectives, aren’t they, equally capable of being interpreted.

I’m not suggesting there hasn’t been movement; I recognise that there has, but I think the certainty required of a core constitutional principle about the relationships between Parliaments—or between Governments, but between Parliaments—ought to describe more usefully, more transparently and more accessibly what that means in any individual case.

But we’re not in a field of absolute ignorance here, are we, because if these adjectives amount to no more than a dead letter, we will know very soon, in terms of their reality by how other Brexit Bills are dealt with, for instance, and other Bills of considerable importance that have devolved implications. So, are you seeing in the intentions, as you understand them, of the UK Government, any signs that Sewel really is now much looser in terms of its application?

Well, just on the first point briefly, if I may, I haven’t heard a strong argument against describing the circumstances in which 'not normally' ought to be applied. I haven’t heard that articulated, why it would be a bad idea to set out more closely how Parliaments should relate to one and other on this important matter. But, subject to that point, no, again, we’re in the territory of waiting for specific indications, aren’t we, which I don’t think any of us wishes we were in. But we haven’t had any specific indication that the UK Government would consider circumstances around the remaining Brexit Bills as being 'not normal'.

Okay. Thank you for that. If we move on to inter-governmental agreements, I share your view that these are—they may be pragmatic, but perhaps not the best way of proceeding, and certainly for the legislatures, it creates all sorts of difficulties. But given we are where we are and we’re going through the most remarkable constitutional change that has a big impact on economic arrangements in the UK, what sort of overview are you maintaining of these inter-governmental agreements? Because their collective impact on the devolved settlement is likely to be considerable and there’s not much legislative scrutiny, which I’m not laying at your door in terms of blame, but it does seem to me that, by piecemeal process, we could end up with quite a different view of the devolved settlement that no-one has ever thought fully through, if we’re not careful.

Well, I just want to make the one point, David, which is that they are agreements within the devolved settlement, aren’t they? So they are, obviously, constraints on Executive action and ways in which the Executive engages with other Governments, obviously. So, in that sense, I’m not sure I would see it as being in that way engaging the devolution boundary that perhaps, if I’m understanding your question correctly, is what you’re suggesting. Governments obviously operate on the basis of Executive action very, very extensively, and that is scrutinised but not pre-authorised by legislatures, unless it’s primary legislation or certain types of secondary legislation, as we know. In terms of the overall impact, obviously we are looking at that and we keep that under close review.

One subset of this area is the common frameworks work, for example, which is, on one view, a great number of agreements between Governments on specific policy areas. In that context, for example, there will be a regular reporting process on those framework areas so that we are keeping an overview of that important set of agreements. So, that work will certainly happen.  

11:55

Would this view that the actual legal boundary of devolution is not affected by Government agreements apply to common frameworks and interim frameworks—that, ultimately, it's a matter of policy convenience and effectiveness and, at the end of the day, at some point, even if powers are frozen, you could have them back—and, therefore, that you take a more relaxed view, then, of some of these common frameworks? Or are there certain principles that you would apply and potentially refuse to be part of a common framework or an interim framework?

Firstly, yes, they are within devolved competence. Secondly, we are not relaxed. We recognise these are important tools for managing policy divergence in a new space, if you like. Policy has always diverged even within the framework of EU legislation but, plainly, the scope for that will be extended significantly beyond the end of the transition period. So, there would be circumstances under which we wouldn't agree to a framework—for example, if we didn't think the devolution boundary was being properly respected, if you like, or properly reflected. So, there will certainly be examples of that. 

The common frameworks programme generally has been the victim of a number of other areas of focus in Government, if I put it like that. So, last year was delayed by preparing for a 'no deal' departure, and I'm afraid it's been impacted significantly by the work on COVID. So, as you will know from our discussions from another committee, there will be a delay, effectively, in bringing forward the frameworks programme, which is very regrettable but I think inevitable in the circumstances.

But just to give the committee reassurance, none of these frameworks will be fully operational or fully concluded until they have gone through the scrutiny of all four Parliaments. So, there will be interim arrangements, but there will be a scrutiny process in relation to each of them. 

Diolch, Cadeirydd. Ddwy flynedd yn ôl, fe gafodd rhewgell ei hadeiladu. Yn y rhewgell hynny mae yna bwerau, wrth gwrs, ac mae pob Llywodraeth wedi cytuno ddim i ddefnyddio'r pwerau hynny nes bod yna gytundeb rhwng y Llywodraethau yn gyfan gwbl ar draws y Deyrnas Unedig. Os bydd sefyllfa'n digwydd lle does dim cytundebau ynglŷn â phob fframwaith unwaith bydd y cyfnod trawsnewid yn dod i ben ar ddiwedd y flwyddyn, beth mae hwnna'n meddwl i'r pwerau sydd yn y rhewgell? Ydy hwnna'n meddwl bydd e'n rhwyddach neu yn anoddach i gytuno i dynnu rhai o'r pwerau hynny mas?  

Thank you, Chair. Two years ago, a freezer was built, and, in that freezer, there are powers, of course, and every Government has agreed that they're not going to use those powers until there is agreement between the Governments across the United Kingdom. If that situation should arise where there are no agreements with regard to every framework once the transition period comes to an end at the end of this year, what does that mean for the powers in the freezer? Does it mean that it would be easier or more difficult to agree to take some of those powers out?

Ar hyn o bryd, wrth gwrs, mae'r cytundeb wedi gweithio fel y dylai weithio. Mae'r adroddiadau oddi wrth Lywodraeth San Steffan wedi dweud yn gyson mor belled nad oes bwriad gyda nhw i ddefnyddio'r pwerau rheoleiddio. Dwi fy hunan ddim yn gweld bod hynny'n debygol o newid, hyd yn oed yn y sefyllfa lle na fydd y fframweithiau i gyd yn eu lle. Rydym ni'n mynd i flaenoriaethu'r fframweithiau lle mae'r mwyaf o botensial i anghytundeb godi, fel ein bod ni'n gallu sicrhau bod y rheini yn cael eu delio gyda nhw. Ond dwi ddim fy hunan yn gweld ei bod rili ym muddiannau Llywodraeth y Deyrnas Gyfunol i ddefnyddio'r pwerau rhewi hynny, hyd yn oed ar ôl gadael y cyfnod pontio. Rwy'n seilio hynny ar eu hymagwedd nhw mor belled, o leiaf. 

At the moment, of course, the agreement has worked as it should have worked. The reports from the Westminster Government have said that they have no intention to use those regulatory powers. I myself don't see that that is likely to change, even in a situation where the frameworks won't all be in place. We will prioritise those frameworks where there is most potential for dispute to arise, to ensure that they can be dealt with. But I myself don't really see that it is in the United Kingdom Government's interests to use those powers, even after exiting the transition period. My response is based on their attitudes so far.

Allaf i ofyn ynglŷn â'r farchnad fewnol? Wrth gwrs, mae'r farchnad fewnol yn rhywbeth sydd heb gael ei datganoli, ond mae yna effaith drom ar ddatganoli o achos hynny. Beth yw'r sefyllfa ar hyn o bryd ynghylch safbwynt Llywodraeth y Deyrnas Unedig ynglŷn â chreu rheoliadau i'r farchnad fewnol, a pha fath o fewnbwn sydd gennych chi fel Llywodraeth ynglŷn â sicrhau bod llais Cymru ac, wrth gwrs, lleisiau'r Llywodraethau eraill yn y Deyrnas Unedig, yn cael eu clywed?  

May I also ask about the internal market? The internal market, of course, hasn't been devolved, and there are implications as a result of that. What's the current situation with regard to the United Kingdom Government standpoint on creating regulations for that internal market, and what kind of input do you have as a Welsh Government to ensure that the voice of Wales and, of course, the voice of the other Governments in the United Kingdom, are heard?

Wel, rŷm ni'n disgwyl Papur Gwyrdd gan y Llywodraeth yn San Steffan ar gyfer opsiynau deddfwriaethol ar gyfer y farchnad fewnol. Rŷn ni wedi bod yn glir, fel Llywodraeth, nad ydydm ni'n gweld bod angen cael sail ddeddfwriaethol iddo, yn benodol un sydd ddim yn ymestyn, fel maen nhw'n bwriadu, rwy'n credu, tu hwnt i EU retained law. Felly, dŷn ni ddim yn gweld bod angen hynny ac, a dweud y gwir, mae hyn yn broblematig i ni o ran safbwynt datganoli oherwydd y syniad yma o mutual recognition. Hynny yw, os ŷch chi'n gallu cynhyrchu rhywbeth i gyrraedd y safon yn un o'r pedair gwlad, mae'n rhaid i bob gwlad dderbyn hynny ar y farchnad. Felly, os ŷch chi'n gweld, mewn cyd-destun, fod gyda chi ran fel Gogledd Iwerddon, sydd yn mynd i fod yn gymwys gyda'r acquis Ewropeaidd, ac ar yr ochr arall y Llywodraeth yn Lloegr, sydd yn bwriadu dadreoleiddio, mae cryn risg gyda ni wedyn, os ydy'r egwyddor honno'n cael ei chytuno neu'n cael ei deddfu, y byddai rhywbeth sy'n mynd ar y farchnad yn Lloegr i safonau gwahanol efallai ac yn is mewn un maes yn gorfod cael ei dderbyn mewn rhannau eraill o'r Deyrnas Gyfunol.

Felly, mae hynny'n eich gadael chi mewn sefyllfa lle, er nad yw'r pwerau wedi cael eu trosglwyddo, mae gyda chi'r setliad yn ei le. Yr effaith economaidd i hynny, wrth gwrs, yw bod incentive economaidd i bobl wneud hynny, ac mae hynny, yn y pen draw, yn mynd i ddisodli'r egwyddor o ddatganoli yn y meysydd hynny. Felly, mae hynny'n broblem sylweddol iawn—os bydd yr egwyddor honno yn cael ei deddfu fel egwyddor sy'n sail i'r farchnad fewnol. 

Well, we expect a Green Paper from the Westminster Government on legislative options with regard to the internal market. We've been clear, as a Government, that it doesn't require a legislative basis, certainly not one that would extend, as they envisage it, beyond EU retained law. So, we don't see that there is a need for that and, of course, this is problematic for us, with regard to devolution, because of this idea of mutual recognition. That means that you could create something that reaches the standard in one of the four nations and every other nation would have to agree to that and receive it in the market. So, if you see that in the context where you have an area such as Northern Ireland, which is subject to the European acquis, and then you have a Government in England, which plans to deregulate, there is a risk then that if that principle is agreed or is legislated upon, something that would go on the market in England perhaps according to different or lower standards in one area would have to be accepted in the rest of the United Kingdom.

So, that leaves you in a situation where, even though the powers haven't been transferred, you have the settlement in place. The economic impact of that, of course, is that there is an economic incentive for people to do that, and that, ultimately, is going to replace the principle of devolution in those areas. So, that will be a significant problem if that is legislated upon as a fundamental principles for the internal market. 

12:00

I move on now to COVID-19—obviously, a very significant development impacting on the constitutional relationship. Dai Lloyd.  

Diolch, Gadeirydd. Yn benodol, felly, rŵan, ar COVID-19, beth ydy eich barn chi ar yr hyn mae'r dull pedair gwlad, felly, o gydweithio i fynd i'r afael â COVID-19 yn ei olygu'n ymarferol? Hynny yw, mae pawb yn sôn am y dull pedair gwlad; rŷn ni'n ei glywed e o hyd ac o hyd. Beth mae hynny'n ei feddwl yn ymarferol? Pa mor effeithiol mae'r strwythurau cyfredol wedi bod i sicrhau bod y dull pedair gwlad—beth bynnag yw e—yn weithredol? A sut mae unrhyw anghydfod rhwng y pedair gwlad wedi cael ei ddatrys? 

Thank you, Chair. Specifically, now, with regard to COVID-19, what is your view of what a four-nation approach of collaboration to address the issue of COVID-19 means in practice? Everyone talks about this four-nation approach; we hear it all the time. What does that mean in practical terms? How effective have the current structures been in ensuring that the four-nation approach—whatever that means—is operational? And how has any dispute between the four nations been resolved? 

Wel, ar egwyddor y pedair gwlad, dyw e ddim yn golygu gwneud yr un peth ar yr un pryd. Hynny yw, mae'n caniatáu fwy o hyblygrwydd na hynny. Mae'n caniatáu cydweithredu ar feddwl drwy'r oblygiadau ac wedyn cyfle i wneud pethau yn wahanol pan fo'r amgylchiadau yn wahanol. Felly, yn hytrach na gwneud yr un peth ar yr un pryd, gwneud pethau tebyg mewn amgylchiadau tebyg yw'r ffordd y byddwn i'n ei ddisgrifio fe, a hefyd yr egwyddor nad jest gwneud fel mae Lloegr yn gwneud yw'r template, fel gwnaeth y Prif Weinidog ddweud. Nid dyna'r egwyddor—hynny yw, ein bod ni'n derbyn hynny fel y man cychwyn. Mae'n rhaid cael trafodaeth a chytundeb neu, o leiaf, ddealltwriaeth ar y pethau yma. 

O ran y strwythurau, y peth trawiadol, dwi'n credu, yw nad yw'r JMC wedi chwarae rhan yn hyn o gwbl. Roedd strwythurau brys yn eu lle ar y cychwyn, wrth gwrs, am resymau amlwg, a gan nad yw'r JMC yn gweithredu fel y dylai fe wneud, beth ddylai fod wedi digwydd oedd cytuno ar strwythurau amgen ar gyfer y pwrpas hwn. Ond beth ddigwyddodd mewn realiti oedd bod y Llywodraeth yn San Steffan yn penderfynu ar ei strwythurau ac wedyn ein bod ni'n cael ein gwahodd i fod yn rhan o hynny. Felly, dwi ddim yn credu bod hynny wedi bod yn ddelfrydol. Dyw e ddim wedi caniatáu beth mae'r Prif Weinidog wedi ei alw'n 'regular, reliable rhythm' o gyfathrebu a chydweithio ar hynny.

Mae'n rhaid i fi jest ddweud hefyd, ar y cychwyn cyntaf, fod cydweithredu sylweddol wedi bod ac, yn nhermau'r Coronavirus Act 2020 roedd cydweithredu agos ynglŷn â hynny. Felly, mae hynny wedi bod yn beth da. Mae cydweithrediad da wedi bod gyda'r heddlu, a gyda'r llysoedd, er enghraifft, sydd wedi bod yn bwysig yn y cyd-destun hyn, a chydweithredu da rhwng y gwyddonwyr a rhwng y strwythurau brys.

Yn fwy diweddar, mae  problemau wedi codi ynglŷn â chyfathrebu ac eglurder neges, fel bod pobl mewn rhannau gwahanol o'r Deyrnas Gyfunol yn deall nad yw'r gyfraith neu'r rheoliadau sy'n cael eu datgan yn San Steffan yn berthnasol yn wastad ymhob rhan o'r Deyrnas Gyfunol, wrth gwrs, a hefyd gwestiynau ynglŷn â datganiadau o ran arian—hynny yw, ddim rhannu gwybodaeth yn ddigon cyflym. Felly, mae datganiad yn digwydd yn San Steffan am gefnogaeth ariannol ac mae cwestiwn, wrth gwrs, wedyn yn codi ym Mae Caerdydd am beth yw bwriad Llywodraeth Cymru, a dyw'r wybodaeth ddim wedi cael ei rhannu ynglŷn â ffynhonnell yr arian hwnnw fel ein bod ni'n gallu gwneud y penderfyniadau hynny yn yr un cyfnod fel y byddai pobl yn disgwyl. Felly, pethau da a phethau llai da.

Well, with regard to the four-nation approach, it doesn't mean doing the same thing at the same time. It does allow greater flexibility than that. It allows collaboration in thinking through the implications and then an opportunity to do things differently when the circumstances are different. So, rather than doing the same thing at the same time, we're doing similar things in similar circumstances. That's how I would describe that approach. There is also the principle of not just following England. That's not the template, as the First Minister said. That's not the principle—that we accept that as a starting point. We need to have discussion and agreement, or at least an understanding, on these issues. 

With regard to the structures, the striking thing is that the JMC hasn't played a part in this at all. There were emergency structures in place at the beginning, for obvious reasons, and because the JMC isn't operating as it should, what should have happened is that we should have agreed on alternative arrangements and structures for this purpose. But what happened in reality was that the Government in Westminster decided on their structures and we were then invited to be a part of that. So, I don't think that has been ideal. It hasn't allowed what the First Minister has called a 'regular, reliable rhythm' of communication and collaboration on that.

I should also say that, initially, there had been significant collaboration and, with regard to the Coronavirus Act 2020, there was close collaboration on that matter. That has been a good thing. There's been good collaboration with the police and the courts, for example, which has been important in this context, and good collaboration between the scientists and the emergency structures. 

More recently, problems have arisen with the communication and clarity of the messaging, so that people in different parts of the United Kingdom understand that the law or the regulations put forward in Westminster aren't always relevant in every part of the United Kingdom, of course. There have also been questions with regard to statements in terms of finance, where information was not shared swiftly enough. So, a statement is made with regard to financial support and then a question arises in Cardiff Bay regarding the intentions of the Welsh Government, but no information has been shared about the source of that funding so that we can make decisions in the same time period, as people would expect. So, there are some good things and other not so good things.

12:05

Diolch. Ar ben hynny, yn naturiol, o ran y dull gweithredu pedair gwlad yma, fyddech chi'n gallu gweld ehangu'r math yna o weithio i feysydd eraill, ddim jest COVID-19 rŵan a mesur argyfyngus y firws bondigrybwyll yna, ond, dywedwch, i'r trafodaethau ar gyfer dyfodol yr Undeb Ewropeaidd a pharatoadau mewnol y Deyrnas Unedig ar gyfer gadael? Ydych chi'n gweld y dull pedair gwlad rydych chi newydd ei ddisgrifio yn cael ei ehangu, achos, yn naturiol, mae pethau'n wahanol iawn pan fyddwn ni'n sôn am adael Ewrop?

Thank you. Following on from that, as regards the four-nation approach, could you see that being extended to other areas, not just COVID-19 and the emergency response to this virus, but, for example, extended to discussions on the future of the EU and the UK's internal preparations for exiting? Do you see this four-nation approach that you've just described being extended, because things are very different when we talk about leaving the European Union?

Wel, dyw'r cydweithio sydd wedi digwydd gyda'r pandemig ddim wedi digwydd i'r un lefel yng nghyd-destun gadael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd. Buaswn i'n dweud bod hynny, siŵr o fod, yn deillio o'r ffaith bod Llywodraeth y Deyrnas Unedig yn gweld hyn fel argyfwng—wrth gwrs, mae hynny'n wir—a hefyd yn ei weld e fel rhywbeth o ran iechyd cyhoeddus. Buasen nhw'n derbyn ac yn ddiwylliannol gyfforddus, hynny yw, gyda'r ffaith bod hynny'n gwbl ddatganoledig. Efallai, petasech chi'n gofyn iddyn nhw i gyferbynnu hynny gyda gadael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd, sy'n destun wedi’i neilltuo, dyw e ddim yn rhywbeth lle buasen nhw'n dweud bod gan y Llywodraethau datganoledig cymaint o lais. Dŷn ni, wrth gwrs, ddim yn cytuno gyda hynny o gwbl, ond dwi'n credu mai dyna yw'r gwahaniaeth ar lawr gwlad, hynny yw. Ond beth sy'n gymwys i'r ddwy sefyllfa yw bod angen gwell strwythurau na'r JMC ar y ddau beth

Well, the collaboration that's happened with regard to the pandemic hasn't happened to the same extent in the context of exiting the EU. I would say that that probably stems from the fact that the UK Government sees this as a crisis—that is, of course, true—and also sees it as a public health issue. They would accept and be culturally comfortable with the fact that that is wholly devolved. If you were to ask them to contrast that with exiting the EU, which is a reserved matter, they would say that the devolved Governments do not have as much of a voice. We would disagree with that, of course, but that is the difference on the ground, as it were. But what applies in both situations is that we need better structures than the JMC.

Okay. Thank you for that. If I can move on now, as I'm very aware of time. Constitutional change issues—if I can can go over to David Melding, please.

Diolch yn fawr, Cadeirydd. We were on the verge of getting some quite interesting constitutional initiatives—the Dunlop review, for instance, or the constitutional commission, which was contained in the Conservative manifesto in 2019, being established and then started. But, obviously, COVID has come along and knocked these initiatives back. But I just wonder, are you having any discussion with the UK Government in terms of what's going to happen to these initiatives? The Dunlop review—I don't think it's been published, has it, in full? Although, we’ve been told that it focuses on efforts to emphasise what the union does together. And then, the intended constitutional and democracy review could be very expensive, but it could be a more modest affair—we just don’t know yet, until there are some terms of reference agreed on that. So, have you had any discussions on these matters recently?

The short answer is 'no'. The First Minister and I met with Lord Dunlop last year. I think he, obviously, understood the points we were making. The report has been delivered. It hasn't been shared with us. I'm sure that the UK Government will use its contents to inform its thinking in terms of the inter-governmental review, but it certainly hasn't been published and hasn't been shared with us.

In relation to the constitution, democracy and rights commission, the First Minister sought to influence, or contribute to the thinking around terms of reference and membership of the commission, and wrote to the Prime Minister after the election. Nothing has yet, I think, been received back in terms of a substantive response to that. Obviously, COVID has happened, and has been happening, since then, but the short answer to your question is 'no'.

And then, accepting that COVID has changed things quite markedly, if we actually look at Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, he decided not to bin the Dunlop review. I suppose he could have done that; he wasn't necessarily committed to seeing that through as it was commissioned by his predecessor. And, obviously, the commitment to a constitutional commission in the Conservative manifesto I think surprised some people. I'm not sure many were anticipating that. So, I suppose the question is: when we get to some form of near normal, do you think these constitutional innovations will continue or the possibility of constitutional development will continue, or do you feel COVID has just changed the terms of trade and reduced the appetite fundamentally at a UK level for this type of constitutional planning?

12:10

Well, there are long-term challenges that have been evident for some time as being in need of repair, so I very much hope that doesn't happen. I would say that I think during the weeks of the pandemic, my own view is that public attention has been directed towards differences in different parts of the UK and how the Governments relate one to another, and in a more detailed sense, I guess, or a more involved sense, about what devolution means in practice. I think that's—in the horrible circumstances of COVID, I think that aspect is positive. My view is that the pressures on the inter-governmental structures that COVID has intensified strengthen the case for the kind of reforms that we set out in 'Reforming our Union'. I think it perhaps makes the case.

I will also say, by the way—I mentioned the police and the courts earlier—I think as well that it strengthens the case for the devolution of justice in Wales. I think, given the impact in different countries of announcements made in another, simply saying that justice is reserved I think fundamentally misdescribes the complexity of the situation. The police are enforcing distinctively Welsh law; we've had the courts complying with the workplace regulations for coronavirus, which we made specifically here in Wales; we've had decisions on prisoner release necessarily impacting our health and housing services. So, I think it strengthens the case. I actually—the First Minister and I spoke with the Lord Chancellor last week to explore a number of these issues and also the response to the Thomas commission, and I'm hopeful that there'll be a good, engaged discussion with his officials around some of these issues. 

Counsel General, can I just check that you'd be okay for another 10 minutes or so?

Thank you. I very much appreciate that. David, did you have a further question? Do you want to—?

Okay. Well, if I can then—. Just very quickly, and it's only an initial foray into the area of justice, because it's an area obviously we're going to explore in more—. Sorry, I do apologise—Carwyn, you had a question you wanted to ask.

Yes, thank you, Chair. Just two questions, pretty quick. The constitution, democracy and rights commission: my fear is that it'll have nothing to do with the constitution; it'll be more to do with reforming the machinery of Government in Westminster, not beyond that. On rights: well, I remember Ken Clarke heading up a commission to look at UK human rights, but it did nothing because it couldn't add to anything. It was already there in the Human Rights Act 1998; they just didn't like the word 'European' particularly. Democracy: I'm afraid that part of the commission troubles me because I think it's going to be an attempt to take the courts out of adjudicating on Executive power and also, of course, there's been some suggestion that the Supreme Court might be abolished and the House of Lords resurrected in its judicial role, which, again, having the highest court in the land for most cases sitting inside the legislature seems to make a mockery of the separation of powers. Counsel General, what are you hearing in terms of potential ideas that have been put out there?

Well, we've had no proposals shared with us in relation to the next steps, if you like, around the commission. I mentioned the First Minister had written to the Prime Minister just to provide some thoughts on how to shape the terms of reference, and one of the things that we think is worthy of consideration—and it's not by any means without controversy—is the question of a constitutional convention and questions around a written constitution as part of that. So, I think there are very substantive aspects of constitutional reform that need to be looked at and obviously we'd be very, very disappointed if the purpose of the commission turns out to be effectively the sorts of things that you were describing, but I think that suggests that early engagement on the terms of reference and membership is important. I obviously understand, in the current circumstances, why that isn't the top priority, but when the time comes for further reflection, I think that a means of bringing in the thoughts and views of all Governments in the UK into this process will be essential to its credibility and the authority that it is capable of bringing to bear.

12:15

Finally from me, just one question: the Counsel General mentioned coronavirus and the way in which it's been dealt with by the different Governments. What we haven't seen, of course, in the coronavirus response, is any kind of dispute as to who is responsible for what. It's been very clear what the powers of the Welsh Government, and indeed the Senedd, have been and there's been no dispute over where powers lie—more that the arguments have tended to be around how those powers are exercised. Doesn't that show, Counsel General, that, actually, as long as you define powers properly and clearly, you don't actually need a supreme authority that can overrule the rest?

Well, the point is, as you said earlier, to have that kind of rules-based approach, isn't it, so that you've got Governments approaching these questions with a sense of parity—parity of participation and of esteem—and I think that is essential? And looking at what changes might be needed in terms of the recovery from COVID, I think there needs to be machinery that is capable of being both agile but also allowing decisions to be taken in a way that reflects that kind of four-nations approach, which I think we're at risk of losing.

Okay. Counsel General, just a couple of short questions, then, only to start the process that we will explore further: in response to the Thomas commission, the First Minister set up a Cabinet sub-committee on justice. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about how that's working, how it's been meeting, anything that it has decided, and how you see that developing.

Well, it had barely got under way, to be fair, before coronavirus was upon us, unfortunately, but it had met. So, the Cabinet sub-committee comprises the First Minister, the Chief Whip and I as standing participants, if you like, and then other Ministers and officials attending as required. Its basic point is to provide strategic direction to the Government's justice-related activity—so, whether those are functions that are currently devolved, on the one hand, agreeing our position in relation to UK Government initiatives and justice, if you like, overseeing our response as a Government to the Thomas commission itself, and then, as part of that, leading discussions with the UK Government on further devolution. Its remit is to cover all of those aspects related.

Thank you for that. Again, another short question, just in respect of the—. Obviously, one of the measures that were taken was the appointment of a president of Welsh tribunals. There has been a first report that was laid, although it's not been discussed in the Senedd. I'm just wondering how you see the situation with regard to when we can expect the second report, and just confirmation in terms of the debating of that within the Assembly, and how you see that role developing.

The first point is that the president is obviously independent, so the timing of the report is a matter in his gift, not ours as a Government, and when it is laid, it will be presented both to the First Minister and to the Llywydd at the same time, so I would expect that the Senedd will wish to scrutinise that in the way that the Senedd would find most beneficial. I'll be happy to facilitate that, but ultimately that's a matter for the Senedd.

I think it's an important area, because it's an important part of the justice system that is devolved and is now establishing its own framework.

And just very finally, in terms of your thinking in terms of the impact of the coronavirus on the actual Thomas commission, do you think it has actually brought a new angle, a new element, to the issue of justice and justice reform?

I think it has shone a light on some of the practical operations of the justice system in Wales in times of pressure, as I mentioned briefly earlier. In terms of our response to the commission, I think, inevitably, the impact of COVID has been to slow the pace at which we've been able to engage with that. People would understand that, generally, but it absolutely remains our intention to take forward those things that are within our responsibility, and we discussed that with the Lord Chancellor last week, and to engage at a ministerial and official level with the UK Government. I hope that the systematic analysis of the evidence-based recommendations in the report will ultimately persuade the UK Government of the merits of devolution. We've seen in a very practical way, I think, over the last few weeks that decisions in one part of the UK affect public services in another, if you like, around prisons and release and so on, so I think having that joined-up approach is very important.

12:20

Those are all the areas that we will be exploring. Counsel General, we've come to the end of time. I'm very grateful for the additional time that you've allocated to enable us to complete those questions. In the usual way, of course, at the end of this, there will be a transcript that will go to you for approval and so on. Can I just thank you and your officials for what I think has been a very constructive session that we've had on a wide range of, I think, very important constitutional issues? Thank you very much.

12. Cynnig o dan Reol Sefydlog 17.42 i benderfynu gwahardd y cyhoedd o weddill y cyfarfod
12. Motion under Standing Order 17.42 to resolve to exclude the public from the remainder of the meeting

Cynnig:

bod y pwyllgor yn penderfynu gwahardd y cyhoedd o weddill y cyfarfod yn unol â Rheol Sefydlog 17.42(vi).

Motion:

that the committee resolves to exclude the public from the remainder of the meeting in accordance with Standing Order 17.42(vi).

Cynigiwyd y cynnig.

Motion moved.

Now, in accordance with Standing Order 17.42(vi), I invite the committee to resolve to exclude the public from the remainder of the meeting. Do Members agree? We now move into private session.

Derbyniwyd y cynnig.

Daeth rhan gyhoeddus y cyfarfod i ben am 12:21.

Motion agreed.

The public part of the meeting ended at 12:21.